Social Tension Index

Background

Extraordinary events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, regional military conflicts, economic crises, and energy shortages, may heighten the risk of social tensions within societies. Social tensions refer to conditions that can precipitate conflicts or violence between various social groups, manifesting as social (Barrett et al., 2022; Barrett, 2024) or civil unrest (Soltvedt, 2022). Such tensions may pose a threat to public order and societal well-being and give motivation to put effords on tension monitoring and prevention. Effective prevention efforts require a comprehensive understanding of the current societal situation. Given that social tensions may emerge from diverse circumstances, developing an index to synthesise key risk indicators that signal potential social tensions is essential. Both objective conditions and individuals' perceptions of situation are believed to contribute to social tensions; therefore, an effective risk measurement index should incorporate both subjective and objective indicators.

The aim of the paper is to present the methodology for developing the Social Tension Risk Index (STRI) and to demonstrate its practical application. A notable contribution of this study is the incorporation of subjective indicators, representing an innovative approach within the field of social risk measurement. Using Estonian survey data from 2022–2023, we analyze the temporal volatility of this index and show its practical utility.

The paper begins with an overview of approaches to monitoring social risk and identifies theoretical risk factors for social tension. Following this, we outline the construction process of the STRI. The results section presents STRI variations observed between 2022 and 2023, with an analysis of different age groups to identify primary sources of risk factors.

What is social tension?

There is no universally accepted definition of social tension. Generally, social tension denotes a potential for conflict, manifesting when negative or aggressive attitudes are triggered in conflict situations (Galtung, 1996). While diverse conceptualizations of social tension exist, it is commonly understood as a condition in which intergroup relationships readily lead to conflict, violence, or hostility. In this paper, social tension is defined as a state with the potential to escalate into conflict or violence between distinct social groups within a society. Although often latent, social tension can surface through public withdrawal or violent interactions among individuals or groups (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012).

According to Smelser (1994), social tension is a psychological state characterized by mental fatigue, irritability, frustration, deprivation, aggression, and societal depression. The concept of frustration is frequently associated with tension; for instance, the frustration-aggression theory posits that frustration is a prerequisite for aggressive behavior (Zillmann, 1979). Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2017) also identify frustration as a key factor in explaining public protests. In terms of measurement, it is essential to capture not only objective conditions but also individuals' perceptions of these conditions. Lee and Shin (2016) support an approach that proritise individuals' subjective experiences. Consequently, a comprehensive measurement of social tension requires subjective indicators, based on representative sociological survey data.

Data for monitoring social tension

Various methods exist for collecting information on potential social tensions within a society, including analysis in social media, sociological surveys, and statistical data.

One approach involves analyzing language use in social media and other online platforms, for instance, Statistics Netherlands (2019) developed a daily monitoring system that leverages social media posts from news portals, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. Similarly, the GDELT Global Material Conflict 48-Hour Trend Report (2016) identifies countries experiencing heightened conflict and instability within a 48-hour window, monitoring broadcasts, print, and online news from over 100 languages worldwide.

The use of media data offers the advantage of rapid information acquisition; however, it is often limited by a lack of representativeness for the entire population. Analyses based on media data tend to disproportionately reflect the perspectives of younger, internet-active demographics. Another limitation is that this approach typically captures information about tensions that have already manifested, rather than providing predictive insights into potential future tensions. Addressing this gap is precisely the aim of this study and the development of the Social Tension Risk Index (STRI).

Another method for monitoring social tension involves the use of sociological survey data. While many studies incorporate relevant questions, few systematically measure social tension. For instance, the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) directly asks respondents in European Union countries about tensions between specific social groups. The question posed is: "In all countries, sometimes there are tensions between social groups. How much tension do you think there are in our country between the following groups?” This survey probes tensions among groups such as the poor and the wealthy, management and employees, men and women, young and old, various racial and ethnic groups, religious groups, and people of different sexual orientations. Although the EQLS was traditionally conducted every three to four years, the time span has recently expanded, limiting its utility for real-time monitoring.

Aggregated objective statistical data at the national level has also been utilized to measure social tension. For instance, Donchenko et al. (2017) proposed a set of broad indicators, including crime rates, drug-related offenses, official misconduct, corruption cases, wage levels, wage payment delays, unemployment rates, housing construction, birth and death rates, price inflation, and the spread of HIV.

While objective indicators provide valuable insights into societal conditions, the inherently subjective nature of social tension necessitates the inclusion of sociological indicators that capture public perception to achieve a comprehensive risk assessment.

Objective - potential sources of social tension

The foundation for assessing social tension risk lies in understanding its underlying risk factors. This section summarises briefly scientific literature on the potential drivers of social tension and provides grounds for the selection of indicators for the Social Tension Risk Index (STRI) (see Appendix 1). We categorize these factors into fourteen groups: life dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction with governance and leadership, limited agency and life control, pessimism about the future, uncertainty, poor health, economic hardship, negative societal changes, discrimination, openess to misinformation, low generalized trust, intolerance, acceptance of violence, and societal inequality.

Dissatisfaction with life

Life dissatisfaction is a significant risk factor for social tensions (Ghatak et al., 2019). As life satisfaction correlates with various life domains, it is widely recognized as a key indicator of overall well-being (Graham, 2009; Smirnova & Iliev, 2017). Disparities in life satisfaction, or "satisfaction inequality," can also contribute to social tensions (Becchetti et al., 2013). In this study, life satisfaction is employed as an independent risk indicator and as a component in measuring social inequality through the metric of life satisfaction inequality.

Low generalized trust and trust of institutions

The emergence of tense situations is often exacerbated by a lack of generalized trust, or distrust of others (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). Additionally, low trust in state institutions can heighten social tensions, as generalised trust and institutional trust are interconnected. Low institutional trust is frequently associated with diminished interpersonal trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008), which in turn amplifies feelings of uncertainty and vulnerability (Spruyt et al., 2018). Such distrust can also foster belief in conspiracy theories (van Mulukom et al., 2020). In selecting indicators for this study, we combined measures of trust and satisfaction of institutions, given the conceptual proximity between institutional trust and satisfaction (see Appendix 1).

Lack of resources, deprivation, problems with income, work, health

Social tensions often intensify with increased competition for resources (Dodd, 1939). The specific resources at the center of competition vary, influenced by individuals’ socio-economic backgrounds. Factors such as income, employment status, and health significantly shape individual well-being and social standing, while perceived inequalities can heighten vulnerability and reduce resilience to social tensions (Ensor et al., 2018; Kern et al., 2015; Ortiz et al., 2013; Jo & Choi, 2019; Sen, 2018; Kakwani & Son, 2016; Bouget, 2008).

Tensions are heightened when individuals perceive threats to their material resources, such as economic stability, territory, employment, and social benefits (Manevska & Achterberg, 2013; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Stephan et al., 2014), or to intangible resources like identity, culture, power, and security (Ainsaar et al., 2016; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Stephan et al., 2014). Tensions are particularly likely to escalate in contexts of limited or deteriorating resources (Jackson, 1993; Esses et al., 1998). According to scapegoat theory (Berkowitz & Green, 1962), individuals facing economic or other hardships often attribute their struggles to external groups. Lower-income individuals are also more vulnerable to conspiracy theories (Constantinou et al., 2020; Hornik et al., 2021; Romer & Jamieson, 2020; Sallam et al., 2020a; Sallam et al., 2020b; van Mulukom, 2020).

According to competition theory, individuals who are socially, politically, and economically vulnerable or marginalized are more likely to perceive situations as conflictual (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Hitman, 2021). Relative deprivation theory further suggests that individuals’ assessments of their situations are influenced by their expectations and by comparisons with past conditions, alternative possibilities, or other groups (Ivanov et al., 2017). Common comparisons include: (a) the current situation versus past conditions, (b) the present situation versus potential outcomes, and (c) one’s status relative to other groups.

Tensions can also escalate when certain groups seek to enhance positive self-esteem and a stronger identity by asserting their perceived "superiority" over others, which can lead to intergroup conflict (Coutant et al., 2011). This dynamic becomes particularly concerning when marginalized individuals construct a collective identity as a unified group of “people like us,” even when this definition is imprecise (Gest, 2016; Runciman, 1966, p. 12). Such narratives are frequently exploited by populist movements (Gest, 2016; Akkerman et al., 2014), exacerbating intergroup conflicts within society (Spruyt et al., 2018). These conflict narratives provide groups with a means of reinforcing self-esteem and politicizing grievances (Spruyt et al., 2018).

A significant source of social tension is the perception of unfair treatment, including discrimination (Smirnova & Iliev, 2017). Studies indicate that feelings of humiliation and perceived injustice can facilitate destructive actions toward society (Krueger & Maleckova, 2008; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). Furthermore, prolonged perceptions of injustice increase the likelihood of conflict (Coutant, 2006). Tension can arise from both objective conditions, such as economic inequality (Hillesund, 2015; Jo & Choi, 2019), and subjective perceptions of inequality. The sense of relative deprivation also contributes to tension (Coutant et al., 2011), particularly when disadvantaged groups stereotype and dehumanize those in power (Coutant, 2006). Dehumanization removes moral constraints, thereby justifying destructive behaviors. Unequal treatment and perceived injustice are closely tied to intolerance, which is itself a driver of inequality and injustice. Social tensions are frequently linked to rising levels of discrimination, prejudice, and anger (Dodd, 1939; Abrams et al., 2021).

Acceptance of violence, anger, agency, pessimism, anxiety

Societal tensions also heighten the likelihood of violence (Bouget, 2008). Violence frequently coexists with social tensions, and the acceptance of violence provides a foundation for these tensions to manifest as public acts of violence. Bouget (2008) differentiates between direct and indirect forms of violence. Direct violence includes hate crimes, physical assaults, and wars, while indirect violence is embedded in relationships and attitudes, which in turn increase the propensity for direct violence.

Various personal characteristics influence individuals' susceptibility to social tensions. Research conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic indicates that belief in conspiracy theories is associated with a sense of low agency, pessimism, anxiety and a lack of personal control (Jutzi et al., 2020; Biddlestone et al., 2020; Oleksy et al., 2020; Kim & Kim, 2021; Šrol et al., 2021a; Šrol et al., 2021b; van Mulukom et al., 2020). Individuals exhibiting these traits were also more prone to heightened fears related to the pandemic (van Mulukom et al., 2020; Kim & Kim, 2021; Pizarro et al., 2020).

Openess to misinformation and spread of misinformation

Social media introduces substantial competition for verified information. As societal tensions increase, the sources individuals rely upon—whether verified or unverified—become particularly significant. Social media can also serve as a source of tension, as its "echo chambers" create a conducive environment for the spread of misinformation (Curiel & Ramírez, 2021).

Individuals with lower educational attainment and less developed analytical thinking skills are more vulnerable to misinformation (Constantinou et al., 2020; De Coninck et al., 2021; Hartman et al., 2021; Hornik et al., 2021; Kuhn et al., 2021; Pizarro et al., 2020; Romer & Jamieson, 2020; Sallam et al., 2021; Sallam et al., 2020b; van Mulukom, 2020). Media environments play a significant role in inciting conflict, often covering potential conflicts in an increasingly sensationalized manner as their likelihood escalates (Dancygier & Green, 2010). Additionally, political and group leaders with vested interests in heightening tensions can be instrumental in fostering conflict (Allport, 1958).

Method - construction of Social Tension Risk Index

Conceptual model of STRI

Our aim was to develop the Social Tension Risk Index (STRI) based on knowledge of social tension risk factors (see previous section). We began with an index comprising 14 theoretical risk factors identified in prior research: (1) dissatisfaction with life, (2) dissatisfaction with governance and leadership, (3) low agency and control over life, (4) uncertainty and pessimism about the future, (5) fear of change, (6) poor health, (7) economic hardship, (8) perceived negative changes in society, (9) discrimination, (10) openess to misinformation, (11) low generalized trust, (12) limited tolerance, (13) acceptance of violence, and (14) societal inequality.

As an initial empirical step, we conducted a comprehensive review of available data and data collection methods to ensure coverage of all 14 social tension risk factors in Estonia. This review encompassed all routinely administered questionnaires and statistical data sources in the country. Notably, no source of recurring social media monitoring was identified. For indicators lacking regular survey data, new questions were developed and qualitatively piloted in July 2022. Following this preliminary data mapping, it became evident that, rather than relying on multiple disparate sources, a dedicated survey or tool would be a more practical approach for data collection, supplemented as needed by select data from other sources, such as official statistics.

Empirical data

In September and October 2022, two nationally representative, population-based quantitative surveys were conducted in Estonia, each with 1,506 respondents aged 15 and older. These surveys included all questions in the final STRI (see Appendix 1) along with alternative question options. This individual-level data provided the empirical foundation for further development of the index and facilitated the testing of optimal variable combinations within the tension factor groups.

The survey samples were drawn from the population register using random sampling. Data was collected through web-selcompeted survey and phone interviews. Population weights were subsequently applied to adjust for survey non-response. Data collection was conducted by the public opinion polling firm Turu-uuringud, commissioned by the State Chancellery of Estonia. Following the initial survey, responses were analysed for study question effectiveness and internal validity, leading to the selection of final questions in STRI.

Indicators and corresponding questions were selected based on the following criteria: (1) each of the 14 factors must be represented by relevant questions, while keeping the number of indicators manageable to minimize admi nistrative burden in data collection; (2) the questions/items underpinning each indicator must enhance the internal validity of the STRI. To ensure validity in selecting indicators for specific factor groups and for the overall STRI, Spearman correlation analysis and Cronbach’s alpha were employed to determine the optimal set of indicators.; (3) question quality was evaluated also through distribution analysis. A response rate exceeding 10% for "do not know" or "prefer not to answer" was taken as an indication of lower question quality.

These analyses were conducted on individual-level data and repeated across 20 demographic groups based on ethnicity, age, and gender. Of the initial 32 indicators, the 22 most suitable indicators (see Appendix 1) were retained in the STRI following these validation processes.

In February, September, and October 2023, additional survey data were collected as part of Estonia’s national social tension risk monitoring initiative. These surveys adhered to the same methodology as the surveys conducted in September and October 2022, incorporating the previously validated STRI questions. All surveys were part of a long-term monitoring system managed by the State Chancellery and were representative of the entire population of Estonia. Sample sizes were 1,500 participants in February, 1,520 in September, and 2,007 in October, with respondents aged 15 and older. Samples were drawn from the population register using random sampling, and data were collected via web-based surveys and phone interviews. Population weights were subsequently applied to adjust for survey non-response. Data collection was conducted by the public opinion research firm Turu-uuringud at the request of the State Chancellery of Estonia.

Formation of STRI

To calculate the final STRI values, we employed three consecutive steps: (1) normalizing scales (Table 1, see the initial scales from Appendix 1), (2) weighting the relative contribution of each indicator within its respective factor group, and (3) summing up the 22 indicators to STRI.

To normalize and render the indicators comparable, all values were transformed to a 0-to-1 scale (see Table 1). This approach was selected over alternatives (e.g., standardization, Z-scores, ranking, re-scaling, distance from a reference) to ensure that the values of individual indicators remain easily interpretable. For each indicator, higher numerical values indicate a greater risk of social tension. Certain risk factors—such as dissatisfaction with governance and leadership, low agency and control over life, limited tolerance, and societal inequality—were represented by multiple indicators, requiring them to be weighted according to the number of indicators used in their measurement (see Table 1).

Table 1: Minimum, maximum and average values of indicators in ethnicity*gender*age groups (N=20, without weighting, normalised)

For its simplicity and capacity to account for potential data errors, we employed a linear additive aggregation method to calculate the values of risk factors and the overall STRI. This index is compensatory, meaning that a deficit in one risk factor can be offset by a surplus in another. While complete compensability among risk factors may be less desirable in some contexts, it does not pose a significant issue for the STRI.

Overall, the index comprises 22 indicators grouped into 14 social tension risk factors. STRI total values can range after weighting from -1 to 14, with higher values indicating a greater level of social tension risk.

Results

The average social tension risk value in Estonia ranged from 3.5 to 4.2 units between September 2022 and October 2023 (Figure 1), indicating a relatively low level compared to the theoretical maximum of 14. Over this period, the overall social tension risk level demonstrated a decreasing trend.

Figure 1: Social Tension Risk Index values in Estonia 2022-2023

Source: authors´ calculations.

Despite the general downward trend in the STRI, rapid fluctuations were observed, particularly in September 2023 (Figure 1). Analysis of risk factors provides insight into the sources of this increase in social tension (Table 2). Specifically, in September 2023, there were notable rises in uncertainty about the future, dissatisfaction with governance, perceived discrimination, perceptions of negative societal changes, diminished sense of personal control, perceived inequality, and a more favorable attitude toward violence.

The data also enable STRI analysis across different social groups. For instance, a detailed age-based analysis revealed that, in September 2023, social tension risk increased across all age groups, with the most pronounced growth observed among individuals aged 15 to 18 (Figure 2). However, as this is a relatively small demographic, results may be more variable.

Source: authors´ calculations.

Traditionally, social tension risk is low within younger age groups. However, in this period, several factors contributed to increased tension among the youngest cohort. Key drivers included heightened openess to misinformation, growing inequalities within this group, rising dissatisfaction with governance and personal life, and an increased willingness to resort to violence (Table 2). These factors collectively elevated the overall risk level, despite reductions in several other risk components during the same period (Table 2).

Table 2: Change of components of STRI between February 2023 and September 2023

Discussion and conclusion

Monitoring the risk components of social tensions may be beneficial in preventing the escalation of tensions and conflicts within society. This paper aimed to outline the principal components of a monitoring tool for measuring social tension risk, describe the methodology for constructing the Social Tension Risk Index (STRI), and present initial empirical findings.

Effective risk measurement requires both objective and subjective indicators; however, few social tension measurement tools adequately incorporate subjective indicators. In the constructed Social Tension Risk Index (STRI), only one of the 22 indicators is objective, measuring “negative changes in society” as a risk factor. The remaining subjective indicators capture the following risk factors: life dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction with governance and leadership, low agency and control over life, uncertainty, pessimism about the future, fear of change, poor health, economic hardship, discrimination, openess to misinformation, low generalised trust, limited tolerance, acceptance of violence, and societal inequality. The likelihood of social tensions and conflicts within society increases as these risks accumulate.

The STRI offers multiple applications. It enables monitoring of social tension risk levels over time and across different social groups or regions. An analysis of the STRI in Estonia from September 2022 to October 2023 indicated an overall decrease in social tension risk. However, a notable increase occurred in September 2023. While the overall social tension risk level remained low compared to the theoretical maximum, further long-term measurements are needed to establish the realistic range of risk levels.

The index also enables analysis of the specific risk factors that contribute to increased tension, both across society as a whole and within distinct social groups. Due to space limitations, this paper presented only age-based differences. The most significant increase of index was observed in the 15–18-year-old age group. Although this group represents a small proportion of the overall population, the index’s methodology allows for detailed examination of the specific risk factors affecting it. For example for 15–18-year-olds, elevated social tension risk was associated with increased openess to misinformation, rising social inequality, dissatisfaction with governance and personal life, and a greater willingness to accept violence.

The index also makes it possible to analyse the risk factors that elevate tension, both in society as a whole and in various social groups. Due to the limited space of the article, in this analysis we singled out only age differences. The biggest increase, for example, was in the group of the 15-18-year olds. Although this is a small group from the point of view of the whole society, the methodology of the index makes it possible to analyse the specific risk factors of this group. Among 15-18-year-olds, the increase in social tension risk are related to increase in openness to misinformation, increase of social inequality, dissatisfaction with governance and one's own life, and an increase in the willingness to accept violence.

The 2022–2023 analysis demonstrated that the social tension risk level can fluctuate relatively quickly. These findings suggest that monitoring social tension risk at monthly intervals is warranted, given the potential for rapid shifts in societal conditions.

In 2022, the STRI was incorporated into Estonia’s monitoring system to track social tension risk levels. We recommend the use and validation of this index in other countries as well. The STRI serves as a practical research tool due to its concise format, facilitating more frequent data collection. This instrument enables continuous monitoring of societal tension dynamics, aiding in the interpretation of changes within specific thematic areas (e.g., identity and belonging, labor market fluctuations etc).

The STRI can serve as a valuable tool for measuring "societal temperature" when used alongside analyses of other societal processes, such as election cycles, significant geopolitical events (e.g., nearby conflicts), and other impactful occurrences. This approach provides insights into the connections between events and their effects on societal cohesion. Additionally, tracking social tensions alongside potential outcomes—such as statistics on violent crime, hate speech, or hate-motivated crime—enhances understanding of conflict evolution dynamics.

Over time, this type of analysis will support the development of an early warning system when examined within the context of societal dynamics. It may also facilitate modeling of various scenarios for societal development, either in the direction of tension escalation or toward enhanced social cohesion.

Acknowledgements:

The work was financed by the State Chancellery of Estonia and supported by Estonian Centre of Excellence for Well-Being Sciences (EstWell), funded by grant TK218 from the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research.

The authors have no known conflict of interest to declare.

This study was conducted in compliance with the ethical standards set by the Declaration of

Helsinki (1964) and informed consent was provided to all participants.

The authors do not share the data according to an agreement with a financing institution.

CRediT statement

Author 1: Conceptualization, Methodology, Analysis, Investigation, Data curation, Original Draft, Writing - Review & Editing.

Author 2: Conceptualization, Methodology, Analysis, Investigation, Data curation, Editing.

Author 3: Conceptualization, Editing.

All authors contributed to the conceptualisation and design of the study, as well as final

manuscript preparation and approved it for publication.

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